Secure Network Coding with Erasures and Feedback by Czap, László et al.
Secure Network Coding with Erasures and Feedback
László Czap
EPFL, Switzerland
laszlo.czap@epfl.ch
Christina Fragouli
EPFL, Switzerland
UCLA, USA
christina.fragouli@epfl.ch
Vinod M. Prabhakaran
TIFR, India
vinodmp@tifr.res.in
Suhas Diggavi
UCLA, USA
suhas@ee.ucla.edu
Abstract—Secure network coding assumes that the under-
lying network links are lossless, thus it can be applied over
lossy networks after channel error correction. Yet it is well
known that channel losses, such as packet erasures, can be
constructively used for secrecy over a link. We address here
the challenge of extending these results for arbitrary networks.
We provide achievability schemes over erasure networks with
feedback, that outperform the alternative approach of chan-
nel error correction followed by secure message transmission
separation. We derive outer bounds on the securely achievable
rate and as a consequence we show optimality of our proposed
scheme in some special cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure network coding assumes that the underlying net-
work links are lossless; thus if a wiretapper, Eve, observes
a link, she gets access to all the information that flows
through it. Since most practical channels introduce errors,
underlying the lossless assumption is an implicit “channel
coding” followed by “security coding” separation: if our
links introduce errors, we need first apply a channel code to
correct them, and then build security on top of the resulting
lossless networks. But as a result, we can convey zero rate
securely through the links that Eve observes.
It is well known that channel losses, such as erasures,
can be constructively used to enable non-zero secrecy rate
over a link. Assume for example that Eve observes a node’s
transmission independently and with a larger erasure proba-
bility than the legitimate next hop node; then, by applying a
wiretap code [1] we can convey through this link a message
at a nonzero rate. Moreover, if we allow channel state
feedback, i.e., the next hop node to acknowledge packet
reception as is the case in most network protocols today,
we can convey a nonzero rate even if the eavesdropper has
a better channel than the legitimate receiver [2].
The challenge is how to extend these results from single
links to arbitrary networks. For a single link, we have an
exact characterization of the secret message capacity with
feedback, yet as soon as we go to a network with more than
one hop and multiple nodes, the complexity of the prob-
lem increases exponentially, as there exists an exponential
number of subsets of nodes that can generate randomness,
create secret keys, and cooperate for secrecy. Finding secrecy
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capacity of a general network is as hard as determining the
capacity region of multiple unicast network coding, which is
a long-standing open problem [3], [4].
This paper provides achievability schemes over arbitrary
erasure networks with link-by-link state feedback. We start
from the simplest case, independent erasure networks with
the same erasure probability δ in each link. We assume that
there exist h edge-disjoint paths from the source to each
receiver, and that our eavesdropper, Eve, observes any z
links in the network. When eavesdropping transmissions on
a link that connects node u to node v, Eve also receives
the transmissions of node u with erasure probability δE ,
independently from node v. We also make the assumption
that only the source node can generate randomness; this
assumption clearly reduces the rates we can achieve, but
at the same time simplifies the problem, and fits well with
the current networking philosophy of having the intelligence
at the edge of the network and keeping intermediate node
operations simple.
Our proposed scheme can achieve secrecy rates that
consistently outperform a separate channel error correction
and secure message transmission approach. Our scheme
applies a separation of two phases, where at a first stage
we generate shared randomness (key) between the source
and the receivers, we use the key for encryption and at the
second phase we reliably send the encrypted message. This
approach is known to achieve secrecy capacity over a single
link [2].
We first consider lossless networks and establish connec-
tion between the secure network coding scheme [5], [6]
and the two phase approach. We propose a modified, two
phase secure network coding scheme showing that there is
no fundamental difference between these approaches.
We then examine how we can take advantage of erasures
and feedback in each of the two phases to achieve higher
secret rates. Over a lossy network the advantage of separating
the two phases and using feedback becomes clear.
Finally, we give outer bounds on the securely achievable
rate and prove optimality of our scheme in some special
cases.
A. Related Work
Secure network coding by Cai and Yeung [5], [6], [7] is
a seminal work in the field of secret communication over
networks. The secrecy capacity of an error-free network is
established and linear achievability schemes are proposed.
This work was followed by a number of alternative construc-
tions and extensions [8], [9], [10], yet as far as we know ours
is the first work that looks at network coding secrecy over
erasure networks with feedback.
Secret communication over a noisy channel was investi-
gated by Wyner [1] and the result was extended for networks
by Cui [11]. Using a similar approach capacity results for
broadcast erasure networks were derived [12]. However, none
of these work take advantage of feedback and thus they
offer any nonzero secrecy rate over a wiretapped channel
only if the eavesdropper’s observation is more noisy than the
legitimate receiver’s. By exploiting a limited rate feedback
significantly higher rates are achievable [13], [14], [2]. These
results were extended for a broadcast setting with multiple
receivers [15], but the generalization for a multihop network
is a new and challenging problem that we start investigating
here.
II. NETWORK MODEL AND BACKGROUND
A. Network model
Communication takes place over a network which is
represented by a directed acyclic multigraph G(V,E), where
V is the set of network nodes and E is the (multi-)set of
edges. An eavesdropper Eve can select arbitrarily up to z
edges of the network to wiretap. A ⊆ E denotes the subset
of wiretapped edges, where |A| ≤ z. We assume that z is
known as a design parameter, but A is known only by the
eavesdropper.
Every link e = (u, v) ∈ E is an erasure channel with
parameters δ, δE . The input alphabet of the channel is FLq ,
length L vectors of a finite field Fq . We often call such
vectors packets. The network node v receives transmissions
on e with an erasure probability δ, while in case δE ∈ A,
Eve receives packets sent over e with an erasure probability
δE . All erasures are assumed to be independent. For a given
channel e = (u, v) let Xe denote the channel input while Ye
is the receptions of v and Ze is the potential receptions of
Eve. Then,
Pr {Ye = Xe|Xe} = 1− δ, Pr {Ye =⊥ |Xe} = δ
Pr {Ze = Xe|Xe} = 1− δE , Pr {Ye =⊥ |Xe} = δE
Pr {Ye, Ze|Xe} = Pr {Ye|Xe}Pr {Ze|Xe} ,
where ⊥ is the symbol of erasure.
After every transmission over a link (u, v) node v ac-
knowledges its receptions (whether it received correctly or
an erasure happened). The acknowledgments are available
to all the nodes causally. We also assume that all the
acknowledgments are public to the eavesdropper regardless
of whether or not the given link is wiretapped.
A source node s ∈ V has a message W ∈ FLNq to send
securely to a set of destination nodes D ⊂ V . Source s can
further generate independent randomness Θ. We assume that
Θ is uniformly distributed and it can be generated without
rate constraint. We will treat both W and Θ as a row vector
of packets. The length of W is N , while the length of Θ,
i.e. the amount of randomness needed is a property of the
communication scheme.
The multicast capacity of G with source s and destination
nodes D is h(1− δ), where h denotes the number of edges
in the smallest value min-cut between s and any d ∈ D. We
introduce parameters h = t + `, where t is the number of
multihop paths between s and d while ` is the number of
direct s-d links in the smallest value min-cut.
1) Notation: The set of incoming and outgoing edges of
v ∈ V are denoted by Iv and Ov .
If E ⊆ E then Yi,E denotes the set of received packets by
the network nodes in the ith time slot on the set of edges
E . Similarly for V ⊆ V the notation Yi,V denotes the set of
packets that the set of nodes V receives in the ith time slot.
In case there are parallel edges the notation (u, v) means the
set of edges starting from u and ending at v.
We use Y iE and Y
i
V as a shorthand for Y1,E . . . Yi,E and
Y1,V . . . Yi,V . We apply the same notation for other vectors
also. E.g. the source node transmits Xi,s in the ith time slot,
while Eve’s observation after n time slots is ZnA.
Fi denotes the acknowledgments of the ith time slot.
To simplify notation, we express entropy and rate in terms
of packets. This allows us to omit the constant factor L log q,
which is the size of one packet.
B. Security and rate
Definition 1: A secure scheme that uses every channel e ∈
E of the network n times has parameters (n, ,N). For all
1 ≤ i ≤ n it defines encoding maps φi,e for all e ∈ E:
Xi,(s,v) = φi,(s,v)(W,Θ, F
i−1)
Xi,(u,v) = φi,(u,v)(Y
i−1
Iu
, F i−1), ∀u 6= s.
For all d ∈ D it defines decoding maps ψd such that
Pr
{
ψd(Y
n
Id
) 6= W} < .
Further, Eve learns negligible information about W :
I(W ;ZnA, F
n) < . (1)
In all our cases we consider linear schemes and hence
linear encoding and decoding maps. It follows that Xi,e can
be written in the following form:
Xi,e = [Θ W ]
fΘTi,e
fWTi,e

where fi,e = [fΘi,e f
W
i,e ] is the global encoding vector of edge
e in the ith time slot. Here we explicitly separate in notation
the coefficients of packets from Θ and packets from W .
Definition 2: A secure communication rate R is achiev-
able over G if for any  > 0 there exists a secure scheme
with parameters (n, ,N) such that
R−  < N
n
.
We call the highest achievable secure communication rate
the secure capacity of the network.
s d
δ, δE
Fig. 1. Single link network
C. Secure network coding over lossless networks
In the special case of lossless channels δ = δE = 0
our model becomes the same as seen in [5]. Here we
shortly summarize the work of Cai and Yeung [5], [6]. A
linear coding scheme known as the secure network coding
scheme is proposed with – in our notation – parameters
(1, , (h − z)+). The scheme uses source randomness of
size z and ensures that all destination nodes receive both
the message and the additional randomness. It is shown that
the secure network coding scheme is optimal in terms of the
achieved rate and it uses the minimum amount of additional
randomness any optimal scheme might use.
Let us assume that Eve simply discards any packet that she
receives more than once. We denote z′ ≤ z the number of
innovative packets Eve observes. Then, we can write Eve’s
observation in the following form:
ZA = [Θ W ]
fΘTA
fWTA
 .
Here fΘTA is a z × z′ matrix and fWTA is a (h − z) × z′
matrix. The secure network coding scheme has the property
that the matrix fΘTA has rank z
′. Thus, ΘfΘTA is a set of
z′ ≤ z independent uniform random packets, while WfWTA
is a set of z′ linear combinations of the message packets,
hence from Eve’s perspective what she observes is some data
WfWTA encrypted using one time pad with key Θf
ΘT
A .
One possible intuitive interpretation of these results is
the following: to give perfect security against Eve who has
access to at most z innovative packets, we need to send
z packets of additional randomness and hence the secure
capacity of the network is reduced by z compared to its
multicast capacity. We use this intuition when we design our
scheme for lossy networks.
D. Secure message sending over a single link
Consider the simplest possible network shown in Fig. 1
consisting of a single channel with parameters δ, δE , and
z = 1.
1) Direct solution: One straightforward approach to deal
with lossy networks is to use a forward error correction
code at all the transmitting nodes and by this turn the noisy
channels into error free channels. We can then treat the
network a lossless network with links of capacity (1 − δ)
where we can apply the secure network coding scheme
and achieve a rate (h − z)(1 − δ). However, having a
single wiretapped link we cannot achieve any secrecy this
way. This approach is too pessimistic though, because it
implicitly assumes that the eavesdropper does not experience
any erasures after applying coding.
2) Exploiting Eve’s erasures: As observed by Wyner [1]
and applied for networks in [11], if δE > δ despite of the
error correction coding Eve still does not receive everything,
which allows to achieve a secrecy rate (δE − δ)+. Applying
this result in a network, for z ≤ h a secrecy rate (h−z)(1−
δ) + z(δE − δ)+ is achievable. In other words, as opposed
to the direct solution a nonzero rate is potentially achieved
also over the wiretapped edges [11].
3) Using feedback: By exploiting the acknowledging
feedback we can do even better. Instead of a forward error
correction code the source can send packets using an ARQ
strategy, i.e. it repeats every packet until it is acknowledged.
Using this strategy the next node experiences no erasures,
while for Eve there is still a probability δE(1−δ)1−δδE that she
does not receive a certain packet. This situation is equivalent
to a channel with capacity (1 − δ) and parameters δ′ = 0,
δ′E =
δE(1−δ)
1−δδE . Hence, we can apply Wyner’s scheme on this
logical channel and achieve a secrecy rate (1− δ) δE(1−δ)1−δδE .
4) Separation of phases: None of the previous strategies
achieves capacity in this setting. An optimal two-phase
coding scheme was proposed in [2], which we summarize
here.
The scheme has a key generation phase and an encrypted
message sending phase. In the first phase s and d agrees
securely in a shared key, which key is used for encryption
in the second phase.
a) Key generation phase: Source s sends n1 indepen-
dent uniform random packets. For the moment, let us assume
that d receives exactly (1 − δ)n1 packets, while Eve does
not receive δE(1 − δ)n1 out of these. Let M denote the
1 × (1 − δ)n1 vector of the received packets. Let H be a
(1− δ)n1× δE(1− δ)n1 matrix, and let H be a parity check
matrix of an MDS code. Then both s and d can compute
K = MH,
where K is a uniformly distributed random key of size
n1δE(1− δ), for which I(KFn1 ;Zn1) = 0.
Of course, we have a probabilistic channel, hence we
cannot assume that d and Eve receive exactly as many
packets as they are expected. Still a secret key can be
established at the same rate with the following change of
parameters.
Let s send n1 = n′1+n
′ 34
1 independent and uniform random
packets. If d does not acknowledge n′1(1− δ) packets, then
an error is declared. Let M denote the first n′1(1−δ) packets
that d acknowledges. Let k = δE(1− δ)n′1 − n′
3
4
1 and H be
a (n′1(1 − δ) × k) MDS parity check matrix. Both s and d
calculates K = MH .
Theorem 1: [2] For any  > 0 there exists a large enough
n1 for which K is computable with an error probability
smaller than , further K is uniformly distributed and
I(K;Fn1Zn1) < 
|K|
n1
> δE(1− δ)− .
In other words, the same key generation rate δE(1 − δ) is
achievable as if d and Eve received exactly as many packets
as they are expected.
b) Encryption and encrypted message sending: Again,
let us assume for a moment that d and Eve receive as many
packets as they are expected. Then let N = |W | = n2(1−δ).
Given a secret key K of size |K| = n2(1 − δ) 1−δE1−δδE
established between s and d, the encrypted message WE is
calculated as follows:
WE = W +KG,
where G is a (|K|×N) and is a generator matrix of an MDS
code. The packets of the encrypted message WE are then
sent using ARQ. Note that Eve is expected to receive n2(1−
δ) 1−δE1−δδE different packets of WE , which is exactly the size
of the key we use. Like in the case of secure network coding
scheme Eve hence observes a one time pad encryption, from
which the secrecy of the message follows.
In our probabilistic model we need to modify the param-
eters as follows:
N = n2(1− δ)− n
3
4
2 ; |K| = n2(1− δ)
1− δE
1− δδE + n
3
4
2 .
Given these, G has to be of size (|K| ×N).
Theorem 2: [2] Given a secret key K as generated in the
first phase, for any  > 0 there exist large enough n1, n2 for
which the probability that d receives WE and can decode W
is larger than 1− , and
I(ZnFn;W ) < 
N
n
> δE(1− δ)1− δδE
1− δδ2E
− .
Further, no other scheme can achieve a rate larger than
δE(1− δ) 1−δδE1−δδ2E .
Theorems 1-2 are stated in a slightly different form in
[2] without explicitly separating the security properties of
the two phases. Theorems 3-4 that we prove in Section IV
generalize this result for a network setting.
III. TWO-PHASE SECURE NETWORK CODING SCHEME
In this section, we only examine lossless networks and
simply make the point that the secure network coding scheme
[5] – with a slight modification – can be cast as a two-phase
scheme. We show that the modification does not effect the
achieved rate, hence the two phase secure network coding
scheme is also optimal. That is, we provide a new, alternative
achievability scheme achieving the secure capacity of a
lossless network. In Section IV we will derive a unified
achievability scheme that will accept as special cases the
achievability scheme we provide next for lossless networks,
as well as the achievability scheme for the single channel
erasure network we described in Section II-D.
A. Example
For simplicity in this example we assume unicast traffic.
Consider the following simple network (Fig. 2). Source s and
destination d are connected through two parallel unit capacity
s d
r
r + w
Fig. 2. Secure network coding
s d
k + w1
k + w2
Fig. 3. Coding with shared key
s d
r
k + r
(a) First time slot
s d
k + w1
k + w2
(b) Second time slot
Fig. 4. Two-phase scheme example
lossless links out of which any one is being wiretapped by
Eve (h = 2, z = 1). The secrecy capacity of the network
is 1, hence s can send securely a unit size message w. To
apply a secure network coding scheme it generates a unit
size randomness r. As shown in the figure, on one of the
links s sends r while on the other link it sends r + w.
The eavesdropper either sees r or r + w, in either case no
information about w is leaked.
Assume now, that s and d already share a unit size random
key k, which is not known by Eve. Then, as shown in Fig. 3
s can securely send two unit size messages w1 and w2 using
k for encryption on both links. Hence, in this case a unit size
shared key allows us to exploit the min-cut capacity of the
network. One might ask, how s and d can set up a shared
key. The secure network coding scheme offers a way to send
any message w securely to d, this message can equally well
be a key k. Consider the example in Fig. 4, where in two
time slots two messages are sent securely to d. In the first
slot a key is set up, while in the second slot this key is used
for encryption. Note that the achieved rate is 1, the same as
what the secure network coding scheme achieves. Also the
amount of additional randomness remains the same.
To avoid confusion we note here that the randomness
used in the secure network coding scheme is often called
a key. Indeed, this randomness is used to encrypt a message,
however this randomness is not known by d at the moment
of encryption. Further, this randomness does not necessarily
remain secret from Eve. E.g. in our example in Fig. 2
if Eve selects the top link to wiretap, she learns r. To
distinguish source randomness from keys we call a key a
shared randomness between s and d which randomness is
secret from Eve at the moment of encryption. We also have
the property that the key remains secret from Eve given the
message is uniformly distributed.
B. Scheme description
The properties that we have seen through our example
can be generalized as follows. We call the scheme described
below the two-phase secure network coding scheme. As
opposed to the secure network coding scheme our scheme
uses every link n = n1 +n2 times, where n1 and n2 are the
number of time slots used for the two phases respectively. We
use the secure network coding scheme as a building block,
we select one such code at the outset and then in each of
the n time slots we use the same code on different inputs.
Hence, we have that fi,e = fj,e = fe,∀i, j.
In our scheme the size of our message is N = n2h. To
securely send a message of this size, we need a shared key
K of size n2z between s and the destination nodes.
1. Key generation: The sender generates a uniformly
random K of size n2z. It also generates additional random-
ness Θ of size n2 z
2
h−z . The key generation phase consists of
n1 = n2
z
h−z time slots, in each slot s securely sends h− z
packets from K. On edge e in the ith slot we send thus
[Θ(i) K(i)]fe,
where K(i) is the ith h − z length fraction of K: K(i) =
K(i−1)(h−z)+1...i(h−z). Similarly, Θ(i) is the ith z length
fraction of Θ: Θ(i) = Θ(i−1)z+1...iz .
2. Encrypted message sending: In the second phase we
use K for encryption and in each slot h message packets are
sent securely. We use again the same secure network code
n2 times. We denote W (i) the first h−z elements of the ith
h length fraction of W and W ′(i) the last z elements of the
same fraction. On edge e in the ith slot of the second phase
we then send
[W ′(i) +K(i) W (i)]fe.
It directly follows from the properties of the secure network
coding scheme that all destination nodes know K and hence
can decode W .
Building on the security of the secure network code we
use we show that the scheme is secure. We delegate the proof
of security to to our technical report [16].
Achieved rate: Our scheme conveys a message of size n2h
using n1 + n2 transmissions, thus our rate is
R = n2h
n1 + n2
=
n2h
n2
z
h−z + n2
= h− z,
which is the same as the rate of the secure network coding
scheme. We further note that the amount of randomness
we use is |K| + |Θ| = n2 hzh−z , which is also the same as
the secure network coding scheme uses to securely send a
message of size n2h. By selecting n2 = h− z the rate h− z
is achieved in a finite block length.
C. Discussion
The two-phase secure network coding scheme gives us a
way to isolate two different problems, the key generation and
the message communication problem. We have to note that
our security argument holds for any secure key generation
phase. In the case of lossless networks the separation does
not make any difference in the achieved rates, since the rate
of key generation is the same as the achievable rate of secret
message sending. However, in some cases this might not hold
and a higher key generation rate is possible. In those cases
designing the two phases separately results in an improved
secure communication rate.
s d
u
Fig. 5. Example network
IV. OUR ACHIEVABILITY SCHEME
We first describe our scheme for a single receiver node
D = d, then in Section IV-C we generalize our description
for multicast. We also assume here that z ≤ h. This
assumption was necessary in case of an error free network
to achieve any nonzero rate securely, however in an erasure
network we can achieve some rate even if z > h. We discuss
this case in a subsequent section.
A. Example
Before a detailed description, we explain ideas through the
example network in Fig. 5. Let z = 1. For simplicity, in the
example when we calculate the number of received packets
we work with expected values instead of random variables.
1) Key generation: Source s sends independent random
packets over all its outgoing links. Both the destination node
d and the intermediate node u receive n1(1 − δ) packets.
On the link between u and d the packets that u received are
then sent to d using ARQ. To complete this task u needs n1
transmissions.
The achievable key rate corresponds to the number of
packets that d receives but Eve does not. Eve has three possi-
ble choices to select a wiretapped link, and when generating
the key we need to consider her worst-case selection.
Case 1: Eve selects the s-d link. In this case the number
of packets that both d and Eve receive is n1(1− δ)(1− δE).
Case 2: Eve selects the u-d link. Since d eventually
receives every packet that u has and every packet is repeated
potentially several times, the probability that Eve overhears
a certain packet of d is increased to 1−δE1−δδE . Node u sends
n1(1− δ) different packets, hence Eve has n1(1− δ) 1−δE1−δδE
packets in common with d.
Case 3: Eve selects the s-u link. We know that all the
packets that u receives d also receives. Eve and u have n1(1−
δ)(1 − δE) packets that they both receive, we get the same
result as in the first case.
We conclude that Eve’s best choice (from her perspective)
is the u-d link. Destination d has
|K| = 2n1(1− δ)− n1(1− δ) 1− δE
1− δδE
packets not received by Eve, hence a key rate of 1 − δ +
(1−δ)2δE
1−δδE is achievable.
2) Encrypted message transmission: There are two edge
disjoint paths between s and d. Let n2 be the number of
transmissions in the second phase. The message is encrypted
in the form that we have already seen: WE = W + KG,
where K is the key and G is an MDS generator matrix.
WE is split into two parts and each half of the message is
assigned to one of the paths. The message packets are then
forwarded towards d using ARQ on each link.
The size of the key K we use has to equal the number
of packets Eve receives in the second phase. In this case,
the MDS property of G ensures that Eve receives every
packet with an independent linear combination of K, thus
the security of the scheme follows.
Since the same forwarding strategy is applied on each
link, regardless of which link Eve selects, she receives a
certain packet with probability 1−δE1−δδE , thus she receives
overall n2(1− δ) 1−δE1−δδE different packets. Hence n1 and n2
are chosen such that |K| = n2(1− δ) 1−δE1−δδE .
B. Algorithm
As a first step we select h edge disjoint paths between s
and d. We ignore all other edges of G. The example in the
previous section suggests that the achievable rate depends
not only on h, z, δ and δE , but also on the number of direct
s-d links. Let h = ` + t, where ` denotes the number of
direct s-d links and t denotes the number of multihop paths.
1) Key generation: We define
n′1 = n1 − n
3
4
1
ζ1 = n
′
1(z − t)+(1− δ)(1− δE)
+ n′1 min{z, t}(1− δ)
1− δE
1− δδE
|K| = hn′1(1− δ)− ζ1 − n′
3
4
1 .
Source s sends at most n1 random packets on all its h
outgoing edges. It stops transmission on each link as soon
as n′1(1 − δ) packets are acknowledged on the given link.
Intermediate nodes on each path forward the n′1(1 − δ)
packets that they receive to the next node on the path towards
d using ARQ.
If d does not receive hn′1(1 − δ) packets, then an error
is declared. Otherwise, let M denote the vector of all the
packets that d receives. Both s and d compute
K = MH,
where H is a (hn′1(1 − δ) × |K|) matrix and it is a parity
check matrix of an MDS code.
2) Encryption and message sending: We find N,n2 and
n′2 such that
ζ2 = n
′
2z(1− δ)
1− δE
1− δδE ; |K| = ζ2 + n
′ 34
2
n′2 = n2 − n
3
4
2 ; N = hn
′
2(1− δ)
The encrypted message WE is computed as
WE = W +KG,
where K is the key from the first phase and G is a (|K|×N)
matrix and it is a generator of an MDS code.
We assign n′2(1− δ) packets to each of our paths. These
packets are then forwarded on their assigned path to d using
ARQ over each link. If d does not receive all the packets of
WE after n2 transmissions, then an error is declared.
C. Multicast
In this section we present our scheme for the multicast
problem, where there are more than one destination nodes
and all of them have to receive the same message securely.
Compared to the unicast scheme only a few modifications
are needed. To avoid repetition, below we highlight only the
differences.
Instead of h edge disjoint paths, first we need to find a
network code for multicasting at rate (1 − δ)h. Again, we
can ignore all edges that are not used by the network code.
In the key generation phase we need the following mod-
ification. Instead of sending new random packets on the
outgoing edges, s selects in advance n′1h(1 − δ) random
packets that are sent reliably to all destination nodes using
ARQ on each link and applying the network code that we
have chosen. The same network code is used in each time
slot. This ensures that all d ∈ D receive the same set
of packets and hence they all can compute the same key.
According to this we modify parameter ζ1:
ζ1 = n
′
1z(1− δ)
1− δE
1− δδE .
Note that this change implies a change of parameters
|K|, n2, n′2, ζ2 and N , however all formulas remain the same
as defined for unicast.
In the second phase the only difference is that instead of
forwarding through h edge-disjoint paths we use the network
code (together with ARQ) to reliably send the encrypted
packets to all destinations.
Another modification is needed in the selection of matrices
H and G. Note that in the unicast case intermediate network
nodes do not perform any coding, hence Eve might only
receive packets that s produces. This property enables to
code only at the source using any H and G matrices that
have MDS property. In case of multicast, intermediate nodes
might produce new linear combinations, hence Eve might
receive combined packets as well.
As for matrix H , consider the hn′1(1 − δ) packets that s
sends in the key generation phase and all their different linear
combinations that the prescribed network code produces. Let
fn1A denote a coefficient matrix of size hn
′
1(1−δ)×hn′1(1−
δ) − |K| that describes a hn′1(1 − δ) − |K| size subset of
these packets. This subset corresponds to a set of packets
that Eve might receive. We will see during the analysis that
the probability that Eve receives a larger subset of packets
is negligible. We select H such that [H fn1A ] is a full rank
(in fact invertible) matrix for all possible fn1A . This property
ensures the security of the generated keys. Later we show
that such H exists and that generated keys are secure.
As for matrix G, we consider a |K| size subset of the
different encoded packets that Eve might receive during the
second phase. Let fn2KA denote the |K| × |K| coefficient
matrix of Eve’s possible receptions that contain the coeffi-
cients of packets from K. We select G such that all possible
such fn2KA matrix is invertible. As shown in our analysis this
property ensures security of the message.
The existence of such matrices H and G is a direct
consequence of known results. The conditions we pose
for H and G are the same conditions that need to be
satisfied when finding a secure network code. In fact G itself
gives a secure network code in a network with parameters
h = |E|n′2(1 − δ), z = |K|. Our condition for H can
be satisfied as proved by Lemma 3 of [5]. Hence, the
existence of such H and G matrices over a sufficiently
large field is shown by Lemma 3 and Theorem 2 from
[5]. A worst case estimate for the required field size is
q ≤ max{( (|E|z )n′1
hn′1(1−δ)−|K|
)
,
((|E|z )n′2(1−δ)
|K|
)}, however any con-
struction proposed for secure network coding (e.g. [17], [18])
can be used to find H and G.
D. Analysis
In case of unicast, the key generation phase achieves a key
rate
κ = h(1− δ)− (z − t)+(1− δ)(1− δE)
−min{z, t}(1− δ) 1− δE
1− δδE , (2)
while in case of multicast a key rate
κ = h(1− δ)− z(1− δ) 1− δE
1− δδE (3)
is achieved according to the following theorem.
Theorem 3: For any  > 0 there exists a large enough
n1 such that the key generation runs without error with
probability at least 1 − , K is uniformly distributed, and
the following inequalities hold for any A ⊆ E, |A| = z ≤ h,
I(Zn1A , F
n1 ;K) < , and
|K|
n1
> κ− ,
where in case of unicast κ is as defined by (2), while in case
of multicast (3) applies for κ.
The scheme is secure and achieves a rate R as given by the
next theorem.
Theorem 4: For any  > 0 there exists a large enough
n = n1 +n2 such that the above scheme is secure as defined
in Definition 1 and achieves a rate
R = h
z 1−δEκ(1−δδE) +
1
1−δ
,
where κ is as defined by (2) for unicast and by (3) for
multicast.
We provide the proofs of Theorems 3-4 in [16] (available
online).
With δ = δE = 0 we see that κ = h− z and R = h− z,
hence in this special case the scheme achieves the same rate
as the secure network coding scheme. Also, for h = z = ` =
1 we have κ = δE(1−δ) and get back R = δE(1−δ) 1−δδE1−δδ2E ,
the optimal rate of a single channel network.
Beside these two, we show optimality for some further
cases, see Section V, Theorems 5-6 for outer bounds and
Corollary 1 for the optimality result.
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Fig. 6. Advantage of using feedback as a function of the number of
eavesdropped edges z, when h = t = 10, δ = δE = 0.3. In this case
multicast and unicast rates are the same.
1) Qualitative comparison: The direct application of se-
cure network coding in an erasure network – as we described
in Section II-D – allows a rate (h − z)(1 − δ). In case
δ ≥ δE , taking into account Eve’s erasures, but not using
feedback does not allow any better rates [11]. The advantage
of exploiting feedback is twofold. First, it allows a higher
key generation rate κ ≥ (h− z)(1− δ). Second, it allows to
reduce the size of the key we need in the second phase from
n2z(1− δ) to n2z(1− δ) 1−δE1−δδE . In this section we illustrate
qualitatively how large this advantage is.
One can immediately see that the larger δE and z are the
larger the advantage of using feedback is. In particular if
z = h our scheme still achieves a nonzero rate, which is not
possible without feedback (assuming δE ≤ δ).
In our example we consider the case when δ = δE . In this
case the best achievable rate without feedback is (h−z)(1−
δ). We consider a network with parameters h = t = 10 and
δ = 0.3. We plot in Fig. 6 the advantage of our scheme as
the ratio between R and (h− z)(1− δ). We see that in this
case our scheme achieves a rate up to 3 times higher than the
scheme without feedback. With the increase of the network
size or δ = δE the advantage becomes even larger. Note
that we have selected the parameter values for the example
such that there is no difference between the unicast and the
multicast rate of our scheme.
V. OUTER BOUNDS
In this section we provide outer bounds on the securely
achievable rates in our network model. In some cases (see
Corollary 1) the outer bound and the rate achieved by our
scheme match, thus the presented scheme is optimal. For
other cases we perform numerical evaluations to compare
the achieved rates with the upper bound.
When deriving our upper bounds we make the following
two assumptions which can only increase the achievable
rates: (a) The set of eavesdropped edges are known, hence
we restrict Eve to one particular selection of edges. (b) The
state of the eavesdropper’s channel is also known to every
node in the network. In particular we give two bounds. The
first bound is valid for any network and depends on h and
z, while the other is valid for networks where Os = Id = h
and beside h and z parameter t also plays a role.
s du
Fig. 7. Two-hop line network
Theorem 5: Assuming z ≤ h, for the securely achievable
rate over G it holds that
R ≤ (1− δ)(h− z) + zδE(1− δ)1− δδE
1− δδ2E
.
We note here that when z > h we can substitute z = h to
get a valid upper bound for all cases. (The secure capacity
cannot decrease by decreasing z.)
Theorem 6: Assuming Os = Id = h, for the securely
achievable rate over G it holds that
R ≤ (1− δ)h−min{t, z} (1− δE)(1− δ)
1− δδE .
We provide proofs of Theorems 5-6 in [16]. As a corollary
of Theorems 5-6 we have the following optimality result.
Corollary 1: Our scheme presented in Section IV
achieves secure capacity in the following cases:
1) h = ` = z,
2) Os = Id = h and t ≥ z,
3) δE = 0 or δE = 1.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Code constructions
Theorems 3-4 show the achievability of the claimed secret
message rate, however no practical code constructions are
given. In case of a unicast problem we need codes with MDS
property, for which efficient constructions exist. In case of a
multicast problem the codes need to satisfy more constraints,
which makes the associated coding problem significantly
harder. Giving a practical algorithm for finding codes with
the required property for the multicast problem remains an
open question.
B. Extension for z > h
Assume z = 2 and consider the two-hop line network
shown in Fig. 7. Against this stronger Eve, we can run
our scheme as presented in Section IV, but with different
parameters. We need to calculate how many packets Eve
might receive in each phase. We give the calculation in
expectation.
In the message sending phase Eve has two independent
chances to overhear a certain packet, on each link she
receives a given packet with probability 1−δE1−δδE , hence the
number of different packets she receives (in expectation) is:
n2
1− δE
1− δδE + n2
1− δE
1− δδE
(
1− 1− δE
1− δδE
)
.
In the key generation phase she gets n1(1 − δ)(1 − δE)
packets in common with u on the first link, while she receives
a packet with probability 1−δE1−δδE on the second link, hence
she is expected to get
n1(1− δ)(1− δE) + n1(1− (1− δ)(1− δE)) 1− δE
1− δδE
packets in common with d, which allows a key rate
κ = δE(1− δ)− (1− (1− δ)(1− δE)) 1− δE
1− δδE .
To calculate the achievable rate (1−δ)n2n1+n2 we need to consider
n1 and n2 such that
n1κ = n2
1− δE
1− δδE + n2
1− δE
1− δδE
(
1− 1− δE
1− δδE
)
.
Note that for any given network and any given set of wire-
tapped edges a similar analysis is feasible. After investigating
all the
(|E|
z
)
possible sets of wiretapped edges, we can design
our code such that it provides secrecy against all possible
eavesdropped sets. However, the worst-case selection of
eavesdropped edges and thus the actual rates achieved highly
depends on the topology of our network.
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